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WE'RE STILL AGAINST FRAUD, AREN'T
WE? UNITED STATES v. O'HAGAN:
TRIMMING THE OAK IN THE WRONG
SEASON
INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or
"Commission") and government prosecutors' have utilized Rule
10b-5 as a primary weapon against insider trading.2 This
method of enforcement began when Securities and Exchange
Commissioner Sumner Pike indicated approval of the rule by
' For purposes of this Comment, SEC enforcement and government prosecuto-
rial actions will be referred to collectively as "government" actions. In this connec-
tion, see infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (positing that distinctions be-
tween private actions and governmental actions are crucial in properly construing
Supreme Court pronouncements concerning Rule 10b-5).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996). Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission) pursuant to its authority under
section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), which
provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
travention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994). In 1942, the SEC exercised its rule-making authority under
section 10(b) when it promulgated Rule 10b-5, which provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
asking, "Well, we are against fraud aren't we?"3 Although sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act")4 was not initially designed to be used in such capacity,5 the
section's broad language has allowed the government to utilize it
to combat trading by corporate insiders.6 Indeed, Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted the undefined and expansive powers of Rule
10b-5 when analogizing the Rule to "a judicial oak which has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn."'
The government has brought cases under two theories of
Rule 10b-5 liability, colloquially referred to as the "classical the-
ory"8 and the "misappropriation theory."9 The misappropriation
3 Milton Freeman, one of Rule 10b-5's original drafters, observed that when he
brought the rule before the commissioners, "[they] read the rule and ... tossed it on
the table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike who said,
Well,' he said, 'we are against fraud, aren't we?'" Conference on Codification of the
Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967) [hereinafter Conference on
Codification].
4 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
5 See Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 n.13 (1977) (quoting
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976)) (" 'Neither the intended
scope of § 10(b) nor the reasons for the changes in its operative language are re-
vealed explicitly in the legislative history .... ' "); RALPH C. FERRARA & HERBERT
THOMAS, FERRARA ON INSIDER TRADING & THE WALL § 1.02 (noting that "[tihe only
provision of the securities statutes that expressly regulates insider trading is Sec-
tion 16 of the Exchange Act ... Present-day liability for insider trading stems pri-
marily from Section 10(b) ... and SEC Rule 10b-5 [which] do not formally define (or
even mention) insider trading."); see also Marc Mellett, Comment, Is There Life Af-
ter Bryan?: The Validity of Rule lOb-5"s Misappropriation Theory, 34 DUQ. L. REV.
1057, 1059-60 (1996). Rule 10b-5 was invoked to prosecute insider trading by buyers
of securities since the SEC had limited the use of the Rule's anti-fraud counterpart,
section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994), to the prosecu-
tion of only sellers of securities. Mellett, supra, at 1059-60; see also Timothy J. Hor-
man, Comment, In Defense of United States v. Bryan: Why the Misappropriation
Theory is Indefensible, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2458 (1996) (noting while section
10(b) is currently government's primary weapon against insider trading, legislative
history of Exchange Act indicates Congress originally intended for section 16 to
combat insider trading).
6 The term "corporate insiders" includes officers, directors, controlling share-
holders, and those who receive inside information from corporate insiders and tip-
pees. See R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 264 (1986).
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). Then Jus-
tice Rehnquist wrote these oft quoted words discussing the extent to which Rule
10b-5 countenanced private civil actions. Id.
8 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657-60 (1983) (discussing obligation of tippee
to disclose or abstain from trading on nonpublic information from insiders); Chi-
arella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-30 (1980) (discussing duty of corporate
shareholders and insiders to disclose confidential material information). The Chi-
arella court refined the elements of the classical theory used against true insiders of
the corporation. Under this refinement, individuals violate Rule 10b-5 when they
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theory was first introduced by the government in Chiarella v.
United States,"0 where the Supreme Court ultimately declined to
address its validity because the issue had not been submitted to
the jury." Five members of the Chiarella court, however, did
indicate varying levels of support for the theory. Thereafter,
several circuit courts have expressed approval of the misappro-
priation theory. 3  Recently, however, the theory has been
buy or sell securities on the basis of material non-public information if (i) they owe a
fiduciary or similar duty to the other party to the transaction; (ii) they owe a fiduci-
ary duty to the shareholders of the company in whose shares they are trading by
virtue of their position as an insider of the corporation; or (iii) they are tippees who
received information from such an insider and know or should know that the insider
breached a fiduciary duty in giving the information. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657-60; Chi-
arella, 445 U.S. at 227-30.
9 See, e.g., SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990). The court in Clark
laid out the elements of the misappropriation theory, which incorporates within the
reach of Rule 10b-5 those who are not traditional "corporate insiders," and are
therefore outside the reach of the classical theory. The court stated:
Rule 10b-5 is violated [under the misappropriation theory] when a person
(1) misappropriates material non-public information (2) by breaching a
duty arising out of a relationship of trust and confidence and (3) uses that
information in a securities transaction, (4) regardless of whether he owed
any duties to the shareholders of the traded stock.
Id.
10 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
' Id. at 236.
'2 See id. at 237-52 (concurring and dissenting opinions). In his concurrence,
Justice Stevens suggested that in determining whether the defendant is criminally
liable under Rule 10b-5 for breaching his duty of silence owed to his employer, "a
legitimate argument could be made that [the defendant's] actions constituted 'a
fraud or a deceit' upon those companies 'in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.' "Id. at 238. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan indicated that
anyone who misappropriates material non-public information has a duty to either
disclose the information or abstain from trading altogether. See id. at 239-40. Jus-
tices Blackmun and Marshall argued that a violation of Rule 10b-5 arises not only
when there is a relationship of trust, but may also exist under special facts of mis-
representation. Id. at 247-48.
"Three circuit courts have expressly endorsed the misappropriation theory. See
SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992)
(stating that Rule 10b-5 is violated by misappropriation of material information);
Clark, 915 F.2d at 449 (citing legislative, administrative, and judicial history of Rule
10b-5 and section 10(b) as support for misappropriation theory); United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981) (imposing Rule 10b-5 liability based on de-
ceitful misappropriation of confidential information), affd after remand, 722 F.2d
729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). Circuits endorsing the misappro-
priation theory contend that the Third Circuit has likewise adopted the theory in
Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985), rev'd after remand, 808 F.2d
252 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017 (1987). See Cherif, 933 F.2d at 410
(citing Rothberg as adoption of misappropriation theory by Third Circuit). But see
United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 943 n.5 (4th Cir. 1995) (contending that Roth-
berg court did not expressly or impliedly adopt theory). The Supreme Court has yet
1997]
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strongly contested at the federal appellate level.14 In United
States v. O'Hagan,5 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit became the second circuit court to reject this fix-
ture of the government's Rule 10b-5 prosecutorial arsenal.' 6
Consequently, the Supreme Court granted the government's pe-
tition for certiorari in the O'Hagan case, and is expected to ren-
der a decision on this split among the circuits in early summer
1997.7
In O'Hagan, the defendant was a partner in the Minneapolis
law firm of Dorsey & Whitney. 8 In July 1988, a large London-
based company, Grand Met PLC, retained the Dorsey & Whitney
firm to act as local counsel in a potential acquisition of the Min-
neapolis-based Pillsbury Company. 9 In August 1988, armed
with knowledge that the acquisition of Pillsbury was likely,
O'Hagan began purchasing Pillsbury securities.Y By October 4,
1988, when Grand Met PLC publicly announced its tender offer
for Pillsbury, O'Hagan had accumulated substantial positions in
Pillsbury securities.2' After the announcement, the price of
Pillsbury stock rose from $39 per share to nearly $60 per share.'
to rule on the validity of the misappropriation theory. In Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Court refused to consider the issue, and in Carpenter v.
United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), the Court divided evenly (4 to 4) on the validity of
a conviction based on the misappropriation theory, affirming the Second Circuifs
decision while failing to provide any discussion.
'4 See, e.g., Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995). The Bryan court categorically
rejected the misappropriation theory, holding that (i) the language of section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, (ii) the legislative purposes of section 10(b), and (iii) the Supreme
Court's interpretive precedent of Rule 10b-5 provide no support for the theory. Id. at
944.11 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997) (No. 96-842).
16 Id. at 622.
17 See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997) (No. 96-842); see also FDA Deposition Re-
buff; SEC Appeals, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 16, 1996, at al0 (noting that SEC asked Su-
preme Court to grant certiorari); Dominic Bencivenga, Legitimate Enforcement?
Misappropriation Theory before High Court, 217 N.Y. L.J. 5 (1997) (indicating Court
will likely hear case in April).
'8 Id. at 614
19 Id.
20 id.
21 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 614. O'Hagan purchased both Pillsbury common stock
and call options for Pillsbury stock. Id. Call options are contracts giving the holder
the right to purchase a designated number of shares at a designated price. Id. at 614
n.1. By the end of September 1988, O'Hagan acquired 2,500 call options, and 5,000
shares of Pillsbury common stock. Id.
2 Id. at 614; see also SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 628 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995) ("When a
tender offer is [publicly] announced, usually the price of the target company rises
and the price of the offeror falls or remains the same.").
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O'Hagan thereafter liquidated his entire position in Pillsbury se-
curities, reaping over $4,000,000 in profits." The government
subsequently brought fifty-seven charges against O'Hagan,
which included mail fraud, violations of federal money launder-
ing statutes, and violations of federal securities laws.24 A trial
ensued and a jury found O'Hagan guilty on all fifty-seven
counts.' On appeal, O'Hagan argued that the misappropriation
theory, on which the government relied to convict him of securi-
ties fraud, was impermissible as a matter of law.28 The Eighth
Circuit agreed and noted that because his convictions for mail
fraud and money laundering were predicated on the securities
law violations,' they were forced to reverse and remand the case
to the district court for dismissal of the entire indictment.28
Writing for the majority, Judge Hansen concluded that nei-
ther the statutory language of section 10(b)2 ' nor the Supreme
Court precedent interpreting that section" supported the use of
the misappropriation theory. In holding that the misappropria-
tion theory failed to meet the "deception" and "in connection
2 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 614.
24 Id. "Counts 1-20 charged [O'Hagan] with mail fraud ... [c]ounts 21-37 charged
him with securities fraud in violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 .... Counts 38-54
charged O'Hagan with securities fraud in violation of § 14(e) and Rule 14e-3 ...
promulgated thereunder. Counts 55-57 alleged various violations of the federal
money laundering statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 1957." Id. The court
noted that O'Hagan raised "a whole host of issues" on appeal, but stated that it
would address only the claims relating to the securities fraud violations. Id. at 613-
14. Although the court did provide substantial discussion regarding O'Hagan's sec-
tion 14(e) claim, the scope of this comment is limited to a discussion of the court's
treatment of Rule 10b-5.
2 SEC v. O'Hagan, 901 F. Supp. 1461 (D. Minn. 1995), rev'd, 92 F.3d 612 (8th
Cir. 1996).
26 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 615.
2 Id. at 622, 627. The court noted that the indictment was structured in a man-
ner that premised the mail fraud and money laundering charges "on the acts alleg-
edly constituting the securities fraud." Id. at 627. When the court decided that
O'Hagan's acts did not constitute securities fraud, it found that there was no fraud
upon which to base the other charges. Id. at 628.
2 Id.
2 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 615-16, 618 (noting that text of section 10(b) is control-
ling and concluding that it cannot support misappropriation theory); see also Chi-
arella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (noting that section 10(b) that is "aptly
described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud").
3' O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 617-18 (explaining that Supreme Court precedent effec-
tively precludes misappropriation theory based on strict interpretation of section
10(b)).
2011997]
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with" requirements of section 10(b),31 Judge Hansen pulled lan-
guage from a patchwork of Supreme Court precedent, which
warned against overbroad constructions of section 10(b).3 2 Simi-
larly, Judge Hansen criticized those courts which have adopted
the misappropriation theory for failing to rigorously examine
applicable precedent33 and for advancing a seemingly facile
"assumed unfairness" rationale.34
This Comment examines the O'Hagan decision, suggesting
that it is an unduly strict interpretation of section 10(b) and an
overly inclusive synopsis of the scope of Supreme Court securi-
ties law decisions. Original Congressional intent and recent
Congressional action justify the misappropriation theory's place
within section 10(b)'s scope. The O'Hagan court's highly lexical
31 See supra note 2 (providing text of section 10(b) of Exchange Act).
32 O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 617-20. To support the assertion that the misappropria-
tion theory fails to meet the "deception" requirement of section 10(b), Judge Hansen
relied upon Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
177 (1994) (refusing to ascribe more expansive meaning to Rule 10b-5 than section
10(b) permits and stating only "material misstatement[s]" and "manipulative act[s]"
are proscribed by section 10(b)); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, Inc., 430 U.S. 462, 476
(1977) (noting section 10(b) does not encompass mere breaches of fiduciary duty ab-
sent misrepresentation or nondisclosure); and Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654
(1983) (stating determination of fiduciary duty is based on whether insider will per-
sonally benefit from nondisclosure).
Judge Hansen further concluded that the misappropriation theory is violative
of section 10(b) requirements because it imposes liability for breaches of duty owed
to persons outside contemplated securities transactions. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 618.
Judge Hansen explained that this extension violates the clear mandate of section
10(b) that the fraud be "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Id.
Additionally, the concept of a "duty" is critical to the analysis of insider trading. The
aim of the classical theory was to prevent an insider of the corporation from using
information for his own advantage at the expense of the shareholders to whom a fi-
duciary duty was owed. Id. The impetus in providing the misappropriation theory
was a need to similarly deter "outsiders" from using such information. Id.
To explain his conclusion, Judge Hansen cited Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230
(stating that duty to disclose arises only between parties to transaction); Dirks, 463
U.S. at 657-58 (stating that duty arises because of relationship between parties to
transaction and not merely because of one party's position in market); and Central
Bank, 511 U.S. at 180 (noting violations of 10(b) occur when purchaser or seller re-
lies on manipulative device or misstatement).
-In this connection, Judge Hansen cited United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933
(4th Cir. 1995), as a case that the O'Hagan court "borrowed heavily from" and one
that yielded analysis which the O'Hagan court "adopt[ed] ... entirely as [its] own."
O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 620.
3' See id. at 621 (rejecting imposition of Rule 10b-5 liability on grounds that it is
fundamentally unfair to allow individuals to trade on basis of information that is
unavailable to other traders) (citing United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1029
(2d Cir. 1986), afTd in part and rev'd in part, 484 U.S. 19 (1987)).
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analysis of section 10(b) and Supreme Court decisions regarding
the misappropriation theory are unfortunately timed. In an era
of increased insider trading investigation, the O'Hagan court's
strict interpretation of section 10(b) severely constricts the gov-
ernment's ability to protect the integrity of the securities mar-
kets. An adoption of the O'Hagan reasoning by the Supreme
Court would force the government to seek legislative reform to
enlarge the scope of section 10(b). The current conservative na-
ture of Congress would likely present an insurmountable obsta-
cle to such reform resulting in very limited prosecutorial powers
for the government to combat insider trading.
Part One of this Comment examines the O'Hagan court's
holding that the misappropriation theory is inconsistent with the
"deception" and "in connection with" requirements of section
10(b). Part Two analyzes the intent of Congress in enacting sec-
tion 10(b) and subsequent insider trading regulations, and dis-
cusses the likely effects of a Supreme Court adoption of the
O'Hagan analysis on the government's insider trading enforce-
ment program.
I. DEFINING DECEPTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE PURCHASE
OR SALE OF SECURITIES
A. Section 1O(b)'s "Deception" and Rule lOb-5's "Fraud"
Requirements
In 1942, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5,35 in which the
word "fraud" was used to outline the range of conduct proscribed
by the word "deception7 in section 10(b).3" Courts initially limited
the application of Rule 10b-5 to situations involving nondisclo-
sures where a common law fiduciary duty existed between par-
ties to a business deal.37 This requirement of a duty was inter-
See Conference on Codification, supra note 3 (noting circumstances surround-
ing Milton Freeman's draftng of Rule 10b-5 in 1942); see also supra note 2
(providing text of Rule 10b-5).
" See supra note 2 (providing text of Rule 10b-5 and section 10(b) of Exchange
Act).
3' See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 343 U.S. 946 (1952) (noting Congress' intent was solely to protect shareholders
of corporations against breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate insiders); Kardon v.
Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (stating provisions of section
10(b) apply to officers and directors of corporations who buy stock from others who
have no knowledge of facts known to officers and directors because of their posi-
1997]
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jected because at common law a buyer or seller had no obligation
to disclose material facts absent a duty to do so.8 The original
effect of this duty was to limit the scope of Rule 10b-5 liability to
traditional corporate insiders.39
Governmental attempts to broaden the scope of Rule 10b-5
liability to include those individuals who were not traditional
corporate insiders were initially successful,4" but subsequently
curtailed in Chiarella v. United States.41 In Chiarella, a financial
tions).
38 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (citing Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 551(2)(a) (1976)). This duty arises when one party in a fiduciary
relationship possesses information which the other is entitled to know as a result of
the trust and confidence embodied in such a relationship. Id.
39 See Kardon, 73 F. Supp. at 800; Mellett, supra note 5, at 1060 (discussing ef-
fect of judicial requirements placed upon early Rule 10b-5 actions); see also Richard
M. Phillips & Robert J. Zutz, The Insider Trading Doctrine: A Need for Legislative
Repair, 13 HOFsTRA L. REV. 65, 74 (1984) (discussing earlier court confinement of
fiduciary duty relationship between corporate insiders and minority shareholders
and noting difficulty of applying same duty to "outside tippees" with confidential in-
formation).
40 In In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), the SEC attempted to as-
sert the broad "any person" language of Rule 10b-5 to extend liability to anyone who
had access to material nonpublic information by virtue of an association with a cor-
poration. Id. at 911. The Court explicitly extended the duty to disclose to all those
who enjoy a "relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information in-
tended to be available only for a corporate purpose." Id. at 912. The SEC asserted
that Rule 10b-5 is designed to address "inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom
he is dealing." Id. The argument that Rule 10b-5 was designed to assure equal ac-
cess to all investors was initially adopted by the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005
(1971). In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Second Circuit reinstated a criminal suit against
a geologist who was employed by a corporation to conduct exploratory drilling for
mineral deposits, and traded in the corporation's securities based on material non-
public information that indicated valuable mineral deposits had been found. Id. at
977. The court, deferring to Rule 10b-5's broad scope, found the geologist to be an
"insider" based on his access to the information. Id. at 976. Over time, courts have
been willing to enlarge-the category of persons deemed to owe a fiduciary duty to
shareholders. See Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of
Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFsTRA L. REv. 101, 107-08
(1984). Later, in United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445
U.S. 222 (1980), the Second Circuit further expanded the scope of Rule 10b-5, hold-
ing that anyone who possesses inside information assumes a duty to either disclose
or abstain from trading. Id. at 1364. But see infra notes 43-44 (noting Supreme
Court reversal of general 'disclose or abstain' duty of Chiarella).
41 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (holding mere possession of nonpublic information
does not impose duty to disclose or abstain from trading). Again, the Supreme Court
emphasized that Rule 10b-5 cannot be read "more broadly than its language and the
statutory scheme reasonably permits." Id. at 234 (quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S.
103, 116 (1978)).
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UNITED STATES v. O'HAGAN
printer purchased stock in target companies without informing
its shareholders of the knowledge he gained while handling
transaction documents regarding proposed takeovers.42 The Su-
preme Court rejected the argument that the failure to disclose
such knowledge, absent a duty to do so, was violative of Rule
10b-5.43 Moreover, the Court held that a section 10(b) duty to
disclose does not arise from mere possession of nonpublic market
information."
In a well crafted dissent, Chief Justice Burger originated the
misappropriation theory,45 positing that, even absent a fiduciary
duty, a person can violate Rule 10b-5 by misappropriating inside
information and later trading upon it. 46 Such misappropriation,
according to Chief Justice Burger, imposes upon the misappro-
priator a duty to either disclose or abstain from trading.47 There-
fore, any subsequent trade would constitute a breach of that
duty and a violation of Rule 10b-5."
The government seized upon Chief Justice Burger's misap-
propriation theory and began to forward it as a basis for Rule
Id. The printer, Chiarella, gained access to the names of target companies
just prior to public announcements of mergers and acquisitions. Id. at 224. Chiarella
purchased securities of the target company before the deal was publicly announced,
and sold them for profit immediately after the announcement. Id.; see supra note 22
(explaining that target company's stock price generally rises pursuant to such public
announcements).
43 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 ("When an allegation of fraud is based upon non-
disclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.").
""We cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recognizing a general duty
between all [market participants] ... to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic
information ... [such a recognition] should not be undertaken absent some explicit
evidence of congressional intent." Id. at 233.
' "[Tihe evidence shows beyond all doubt that Chiarella ... misappropriated-
stole to put it bluntly-valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the ut-
most confidence. He then exploited his ill-gotten informational advantage by pur-
chasing securities in the market. In my view, such conduct plainly violates § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5." Id. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
" Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240. Chief Justice Burger noted the common law rule
that a party to an arms-length business transaction has no duty to disclose infor-
mation to the other "unless the parties stand in some confidential or fiduciary rela-
tion." Id. Chief Justice Burger further argued that the common law rule should "give
way when an informational advantage is obtained, not by superior experience, fore-
sight, or industry, but by some unlawful means." Id. He then concluded that section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 encompass the idea "that a person who has misappropriated
nonpublic information has an absolute duty" to disclose or abstain from trading. Id.
47 Id. at 240.
4See supra notes 45-46 (explaining Chief Justice Burger's theory).
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10b-5 liability on the trial level.49 Within ten years, three federal
circuit courts expressly adopted the theory." These courts have
held that the requisite fraud needed for Rule 10b-5 liability is
present in the misappropriation of confidential information.51
Proponents of the theory believe that:
[buy becoming part of a fiduciary or similar relationship, an in-
dividual is implicitly stating that she will not divulge or use to
her own advantage information entrusted to her in the utmost
confidence. She deceives the other party by playing the role of
the trustworthy employee or agent; she defrauds it by actually
52using the stolen information to its detriment.
B. The O'Hagan Court's Analysis of section 1O(b)'s "Deception"
Requirement
It is submitted that the O'Hagan court used a narrow read-
ing of section 10(b) and a strained analysis of Supreme Court
precedent to conclude that the misappropriation theory does not
mandate "deception."53 Indicating that it was undertaking a very
textual analysis,54 the court heavily relied upon Central Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., in which
the Supreme Court narrowly construed Rule 10b-5.56 Similarly,
49 See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir.) (arguing for im-
position of Rule 10b-5 liability on "outsider" based on misappropriation theory), affd
after remand, 722 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
" See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991) (expressly adopting misappro-
priation theory), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 449
(9th Cir. 1990); Newman, 664 F.2d 12; see also Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d
818, 823 (3d Cir. 1985) (arguably adopting misappropriation theory), rev'd after re-
mand, 808 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017 (1987).
"' See, e.g., Newman, 664 F.2d at 17 ("[W]e need spend little time on the issue of
fraud and deceit .... [T]he defendant 'misappropriated-stole to put it bluntly-
valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the utmost confidence.' ")
(quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 245 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing)).
g2 Clark, 915 F.2d at 448.
"[Clontrary to § 10(b)'s explicit requirements, the misappropriation theory
does not require 'deception,' and, even assuming that it does, it renders nugatory
the requirement that the 'deception' be 'in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.' "United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 617 (8th Cir. 1996).
'The O'Hagan court suggested that the Supreme Court has "repeatedly held"
that Rule 10b-5 has inelastic bounds. Id. But see infra notes 59-65 and accompany-
ing text (arguing O'Hagan court's reliance on Supreme Court pronouncements was
misplaced).
'" 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
56 Id. at 179 (concluding § 10(b) does not contemplate aiding and abetting liabil-
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the court cited Santa Fe Industries v. Green,57 to justify its con-
clusion that the misappropriation theory is invalid because it
permits the imposition of Rule 10b-5 liability "without misrepre-
sentation or nondisclosure."58 Rather than conducting an inde-
pendent review of section 10(b)'s language, the O'Hagan court
relied exclusively upon the aforementioned Supreme Court in-
terpretations of Rule 10b-5's reach under section 10(b) which are
distinguishable from the case at bar. 9
The O'Hagan court mistakenly relied upon the Supreme
Court's decision in Central Bank, which only contemplated the
scope of private causes of action under section 10(b). 60 Similarly,
reliance on Santa Fe was misguided because the Supreme Court
only addressed the availability of a private cause of action for
minority shareholders based on the alleged negligent conduct of
majority shareholders.6' Public policy considerations in govern-
mental enforcement actions differ widely from those present in
the Supreme Court cases relied upon by O'Hagan."2 It is not con-
57 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (holding in private action under Rule 10b-5 mere in-
stances of corporate mismanagement in which essence of complaint is that share-
holders were treated unfairly by fiduciary are not violative of section 10(b) or Rule
10b-5).
's O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 618.
"Id. at 617-18. The Court never independently dissected the statutory lan-
guage in section 10(b). Indeed, the Court itself suggested that it disapproved of the
misappropriation theory simply "[aifter carefully studying the Supreme Court's
teachings on the scope of conduct reachable under § 10(b) ... coupled with the recent
Central Bank ruling." Id. at 617 (emphasis added).
'0 See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
180 (1994). Analysis of Central Bank indicates that the O'Hagan court was grap-
pling with the "scope of conduct prohibited under § 10(b)" within the confines of
"determining the elements of the 10b-5 private liability scheme." Id. at 173
(emphasis added). The Court noted that the idea of private liability under 10b-5 was
judicially created and previous cases regarding private suits had emphasized rigid
adherence to statutory language. Id.
6' See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 464-65 (1977). The Santa Fe court
pointed out that "not all breaches of a fiduciary duty in connection with a securities
transaction come within the ambit of Rule 10b-5." Id. at 472. This statement, how-
ever, finds no discord in the misappropriation theory. In fact, it has been noted that
a fiduciary's breach of the duty of care or of loyalty, if accompanied by full disclo-
sure, would not amount to deception or fraud actionable under the misappropriation
theory. See Recent Cases, Securities Law-Insider Trading-Fourth Circuit Rejects
Misappropriation Theory of Rule 10b-5 Fraud Liability, 109 HARV. L. REv. 524, 536
(1995) [hereinafter Recent Cases]. Notably, the very facts presented in Santa Fe, an
allegedly unfairly structured merger accompanied by full disclosure, "would not con-
stitute misappropriation for § 10(b) purposes." Id. at 539 n.25.
See infra notes 65 (comparing public policy discussed in Supreme Court deci-
sions to public policy considerations in government enforcement actions). Indeed,
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tended that the misappropriation theory is mandated by the lan-
guage of section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, but rather that the broad
wording of those sections in light of the SEC's congressional
mandate permits such interpretation. Consequently, the judici-
ary is left to delineate the scope of section 10(b) by way of policy
considerations."
The O'Hagan court's reliance on Supreme Court policy
analysis wholly distinguishable from criminal cases such as
O'Hagan' was an abdication of its own duty to accord proper
directly after the Central Bank court indicated the text of the act was controlling, it
repeated a concern for limiting the private liability scheme by stating, "our cases
considering the scope of conduct prohibited by § 10(b) in private suits have empha-
sized adherence to the statutory language." Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court's hesitance in creating and thereafter ex-
panding private rights of action is well established. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Red-
ington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979) ("[Ilmplying a private right of action on the basis of
congressional silence is a hazardous enterprise, at best."); Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 64 (1978) (stating that courts must be unusually hesitant to
infer private rights of action from congressional silence).
6' See Recent Cases, supra note 61, at 538 ("[Gliven the broad wording and scant
legislative history of section 10(b) ... courts appear to have a large and inescapable
role in making their own policy judgments regarding the scope and aims of the stat-
ute and rule."); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737
(1975) ("It is therefore proper that we consider ... [in Rule 10b-5 cases] what may be
described as policy considerations when we come to flesh out the portions of the law
with respect to which neither the congressional enactment nor the administrative
regulations offer conclusive guidance.").
' Most of the cases cited in O'Hagan turn on policy considerations unrelated to
criminal prosecutions, such as cases involving private causes of action under Rule
lOb-5, including (i) the potential for vexatious litigation "different in degree and in
kind from that which accompanies litigation in general," Blue Chip Stamps, 421
U.S. at 739, (ii) the potential for significant interference with normal market activ-
ity resulting from "nuisance" suits (also known as "strike" or "blackmail" suits), id.
at 740-41, and (iii) the "potential for possible abuse of the liberal discovery provi-
sions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," id. at 741. It is clear that the Su-
preme Court is reticent in these private Rule 10b-5 cases to permit judicial access to
"plaintifIhs] with ... largely groundless claim[sl." Id.; see also Central Bank, 511 U.S.
at 180 (refusing extension of aiding and abetting liability to private actions citing
policy reasons in light of Congressional intent); Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479
(concurring with Blue Chip Stamps' concern regarding vexatious litigation). Con-
versely, the Supreme Court has recognized the government's role in carrying out the
broad aims of the statutory scheme in section 10(b). See Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199-200 (1976) (noting section 10(b) was "catchall" section
of remedial legislation which should be construed flexibly); see also United States v.
Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 946-47 (4th Cir. 1995) (conceding principal concern of section
10(b) is protection of purchasers and sellers of securities). Indeed, the text of section
10(b) expressly provides the policy analysis that should be undertaken in granting
the SEC power to create rules that the agency deems to be "in the public interest."
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
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weight to policy considerations, 5 as well as a clear rejection of
the deference traditionally accorded to administrative agencies
empowered by broad congressional mandate.6 In sum, it is
submitted that the deceitful activity required by the misappro-
priation theory fits comfortably within the scope of section 10(b),
and that the Supreme Court cases relied upon by the O'Hagan
court do not necessitate a different understanding.
C. The Nexus: Section 1O(b)'s "In Connection With" Requirement
The O'Hagan court held that the misappropriation theory
failed "on another, more obvious basis."87 Section 10(b) requires
that the deception involved be "in connection with the purchase
or sale"68 of securities. Citing certain Supreme Court decisions
as dispositive,69 the O'Hagan court held that the misappropria-
" See Recent Cases, supra note 61, at 538 (noting court's policy making role in
construing section 10(b) because of broad language used by Congress). Congress
cannot, of course, delegate its general role as policy maker to administrative agen-
cies, but may delegate specific policy making tasks to such agencies either expressly
or implicitly. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (discussing policy making role of agencies in relation to
Congressional intent and action). Therefore, to the extent that Congress, through
section 10(b), gave the SEC power to "prescribe [rules] ... in the public interest," ju-
dicial deference in reviewing the SEC's own interpretations of Rule 10b-5 should be
at its apogee. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); see
also Recent Cases, supra note 61, at 541 (arguing that misappropriation "theory
does serve broader, public interest functions....").
c' See supra note 64 (noting intent of Congress to grant SEC broad rule making
authority); see also Nat Stern, The Constitutionalization of Rule lOb-5, 27 RUTGERS
L.J. 1 (1995) (discussing Supreme Court's application of constitutional law doctrine
and ignorance of traditional methods of statutory interpretation). Most of Professor
Stern's thoughtful exposition on the Supreme Court's recent restrictive views of
section 10(b) is beyond the scope of this Comment. Professor Stern asserts, however,
that the Supreme Court's formal stance is to recognize "a generous latitude for rea-
sonable agency interpretation[s]" of statutes where the statutory language does not
clearly resolve the issue at hand. Id. at 24 (citing generally P.U.D. No.1 v. Washing-
ton Dep't of Ecology, 571 U.S. 700, 711-13 (1994); Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 269
(1993)). With regard to section 10(b), the Supreme Court recognized that the lan-
guage could not resolve the issue, and that it was not able to "divine ... the intent of
Congress." Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737. The O'Hagan court refused to even
feign recognition of the Supreme Court's formal doctrine by dismissing the reason-
able interpretation of section 10(b) made by the SEC, as well as the application of
this theory by sister circuits which have adopted the misappropriation theory.
O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 618 (noting court "need not tarry long" on issue of decep-
tion because misappropriation theory fails "in connection with" requirement).
6 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); see also su-
pra note 2 (providing text of section 10(b)).
c' See O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 618 (analyzing Supreme Court decisions in Chiarella,
Dirks, and Central Bank with regard to section 10(b)'s "in connection with" lan-
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tion theory failed to meet the "in connection with" requirement of
section 10(b) because the theory "permits liability for a breach of
duty owed to individuals who are unconnected to and perhaps
uninterested in ... securities transaction[s].""
The O'Hagan court extrapolated too much from the Supreme
Court cases it relied upon and ignored Supreme Court precedent
tending to indicate that the "in connection with" requirement is
not actually an onerous one. For example, in Superintendent of
Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,71 the Supreme Court
stated that the fraud must merely "touch" the purchase or sale of
any security.72 Additionally, the O'Hagan court heavily relied
upon United States v. Bryan,3 which expressly recognized that
the Supreme Court has not restricted the scope of section 10(b)
to reach only purchasers or sellers.74 Further, it has been widely
recognized that trading involving the misappropriation of inside
information can seriously damage market integrity and cause
injury to investors and market stability as a whole.75 It is doubt-
guage). The court posited that the Supreme Court pronouncements in the Chiarella,
Dirks, and Central Bank cases applied to the O'Hagan case and weighed the gov-
ernment's arguments "[algainst this venerable body of law." Id. at 619. The court
then concluded that after careful scrutiny of the Supreme Court's analysis in those
cases, "the misappropriation theory ... cannot be defended." Id. at 619.
0 Id. at 618. Noting that the Supreme Court explained the principal concern of
section 10(b) is the "protection of purchasers and sellers of securities," id. (quoting
United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 946-47 (4th Cir. 1995)), the O'Hagan court de-
cided that the misappropriation theory failed to meet the requirements of section
10(b) because it could potentially impose liability upon a class of persons outside the
realm of traditional purchasers or sellers. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 619. In short, it is
troubling to critics of the misappropriation theory that liability could be liberally
expanded beyond the parties to the transaction to 'an infinite number of trust rela-
tionships." Id.
71 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
72 Id. at 12-13 (stating section 10(b) is violated when injury is suffered "as a re-
sult of deceptive practices touching" securities transactions).
'3 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
"4 See id. at 948 (noting Court has not expressly limited scope of statute to pur-
chasers and sellers, but has loosely defined outer limits as reaching no further than
fraud upon investors); William R. McLucas & Alma M. Angotti, Insider Trading: Is
It Back or Did It Ever Go Away?, INSIGHTS, vol. 9, no. 10, 8 (October 1995) (noting
that Supreme Court has not set up restrictive "in connection with" standard Bryan
court implemented).
' McLucas & Angotti, supra note 74, at 8. Trading by misappropriators is likely
to drive up "the price of the company's securities, making the bidder's acquisition
more expensive." Id. at 11 n.83. Additionally, the rise in purchase price may induce
other investors holding securities of that company to sell quickly, at a lower price
than could be realized on a sale after the public dissemination of the information
stolen by the misapproriator. Id. at 11 n.84. There is also general injury to the pub-
lic in such trades by misappropriators of information "to the extent that the honesty
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ful that corporations attempting to acquire other companies,
when faced with higher acquisition costs resulting from a misap-
propriator's trades, would agree that the corporation had no
"connection" to the purchase of securities by the misappropria-
tor.6 It is submitted that the O'Hagan court followed an unduly
restrictive reading of section 10(b) because the Supreme Court
did not propound an exhaustive list of possible parties meeting
the "in connection with" test, and because the "touch" test enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court should be read in conjunction with
Congress' broad attempt to proscribe practices that "fulfill no
useful function"7 7 in the securities markets.78
II. LIKELY EFFECTS OF AN ADOPTION OF THE O'HAGAN ANALYSIS
The Exchange Act was passed in response to the 1929 mar-
ket crash, which Congress determined was fueled largely by the
inside trading of market participants.79 In passing the Exchange
and integrity of the markets are impaired." Id. It is the preservation of market in-
tegrity otherwise injured by manipulative trading that members of the Supreme
Court have noted "lies close to the heart of what the securities laws are intended to
prohibit." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 246 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting).
"' See McLucas & Agnotti, supra note 74, at 11 n.83 (noting acquiring company
will incur higher acquisition expenses because of misappropriator's trades). Addi-
tionally, O'Hagan was purchasing 30-day stock options, and was thus prompted to
continually seek new inside information for determining whether to purchase new
options after older ones had expired. See supra note 21 (explaining call option con-
tracts). Thus, "the connection between the information acquisition and the purchase
decision ... seems closer than in most cases." John C. Coffee Jr., "In O'Hagan, the
Supreme Court gets second chance to adopt, and define the scope of, SEC's
'misappropriation theory' of insider trading," NATL L.J., Feb. 17, 1997, at B5.
77See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 450 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting S. REP. No. 73-
792, at 6 (1934)). The phrase "no useful function" has been called upon by courts to
support a broad reading of section 10(b). See id. (citing United States v. Carpenter,
791 F.2d 1024, 1030 (2d Cir. 1986), affd in part and rev'd in part, 484 U.S. 19
(1987); SEC v. Peters, 735 F. Supp. 1505, 1519 (D. Kan. 1990)).
"' The O'Hagan court's recognition of the constitutional confines of Rule 10b-5,
namely that Rule 10b-5 can be read no more broadly than section 10(b) permits, may
have precluded the court's application of more traditional methods of statutory ex-
amination. See Stern, supra note 66, at 3 ("By transplanting a constitutional ap-
proach to this setting, the Court has slighted the usual doctrine and philosophy of
statutory construction."). A preferable approach would be to adopt a more tradi-
tional analysis of agency interpretation of congressional statutes, involving judicial
deference to reasonable agency interpretations, and substantive examinations of
congressional intent. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
79'The anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts were aimed at the ineq-
uitable trade practices which were considered a cause of the loss of investor confi-
dence which led to the stock market's malfunction in 1929." Mellett, supra note 5, at
1059; see also EDWARD C. FLETCHER, MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSIDER TRADING
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Act, Congress conclusively determined that insider trading was
not helpful to the market system and wanted the practice out-
lawed."0 Congress thereby created the SEC and gave that agency
both the power to regulate securities exchanges and the duty to
preserve the general integrity of the markets.81 Congress en-
trusted the SEC with these powers along with broad mandates
to regulate "in the public interest."82 It is against this backdrop
that the O'Hagan court should have construed the government's
development and reliance on the misappropriation theory. This
history clearly demonstrates the differences between the cases
relied upon by the O'Hagan court and criminal prosecutions un-
der section 10(b). Necessity dictates that courts distinguish
questions concerning the scope of the implied private cause of
action under section 10(b),"3 from questions concerning govern-
mental enforcement efforts.8
45 (1991).
80 See generally Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk
(1994); Horman, supra note 5, at 2457 ("Insider trading was one of the major abuses
that Congress perceived as a cause of the 1929 crash. Congress believed that
fraudulent activities served 'no useful economic function' and caused 'great detri-
ment to the investing public.'" (citing S. REP. No. 73-792, at 3 (1934))); Mellett, su-
pra note 5, at 1072-73 (explaining Congress' concern over deleterious effect of ineq-
uitable trade practices upon market); see also supra note 77 (explaining that
Congress proscribed manipulative and deceptive practices that served "no useful
function"). Congress criminalized insider trading despite arguments by some aca-
demics forwarding the notion that insider trading is a victimless activity and actu-
ally makes markets more efficient. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and
the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 548-49 (1970) (positing that insider trad-
ing regulation hurts market efficiency and that such regulation is result of
"outgrowth of frustration" rather than "cogent analysis.").
81 See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1994) (establishing SEC); 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994)
(indicating securities transactions are "affected with a national public interest
which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of ... transactions
and ... practices and matters relat[ed]" to such transactions); 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1994)
(granting SEC power to promulgate rules "necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.").
2 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); see also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336
(1967) (stating Exchange Act should be construed broadly to effectuate its remedial
nature). Moreover, the general socio-economic and legislative history behind the en-
actment of the federal securities laws indicate that Congress intended for the anti-
fraud provisions of the Exchange Act to be construed broadly. See Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 241 (1980) ("The very language of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 by repeated use of the word 'any' [was] obviously meant to be inclusive" (quoting
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)).
' See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 166 (1994)
(stating courts have implied private rights of action enabling private plaintiffs to
sue under section 10(b)).
8 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
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In choosing to undertake a highly captious analysis of the
misappropriation theory, the O'Hagan court lost sight of the
purposes of section 10(b) and stripped from Rule 10b-5 some of
the adaptive power it has demonstrated for over fifty years."
Should the Supreme Court adopt the O'Hagan court's analysis,
the SEC will be forced to seek legislative revision of the govern-
ing statutes in order to effectively comply with their original
congressional mandate. In light of two recent failed attempts by
' See Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM
L. REV. S7 (1993). Professor Langevoort posits that Rule 10b-5 has developed over
fifty years to be an enduring and workable foundation from which to attack insider
trading. Id. Professor Langevoort traced society's image of reality in the investing
world since the late 1960's and asserted that changes in such social construction
have affected the manner in which securities regulators and courts have viewed the
role of Rule 10b-5. Id. at S12-S15. Professor Langevoort suggested that securities
markets in the late 1960's were dominated by individual investors, perceived as
powerless corporate governors. Id. at Sl. Consequently, the role of Rule 10b-5, and
securities regulation in general, was in the nature of consumer protection. Id. (citing
Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 473-74 (imposing deception requirement in 10b-5 actions);
Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 214 (imposing scienter requirement in 10b-5 actions);
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 748-49 (limiting parties able to bring 10b-5 private
actions)). Professor Langevoort noted that the Supreme Court's curtailing of Rule
10b-5 in the 1970's was influenced by a conservatism in scholarly literature, and a
general societal distrust for institutions. Langevoort, supra, at S12. Additionally,
the shift toward the institutionalization of investment-through pension and mu-
tual funds-which was previously undertaken on an individualized scale obviated
the need for a consumer protection focus in Rule 10b-5 actions. Id. at S13. In the
late 1970's and throughout the 1980's, economists and legal scholars promoted the
hypothesis that markets were complex and efficient mechanisms that protected in-
vestors through speedy processing of vast information, and concomitant price cor-
rection. Id. During this period, securities regulation was viewed as an interference
with the perceived total efficiency and self-correcting characteristics of the markets.
Id. Professor Langevoort suggested that this "efficient market" theory contributed to
the Supreme Court's decisions in Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233-34, and Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983), both of which noted a desire not to "chill" the dissemina-
tion of market information which benefits all investors. Langevoort, supra, at S14.
Finally, Professor Langevoort noted the development, since the late 1980's, of the
idea that the market is less than efficient, and often operates irrationally. Id. at
S15. Professor Langevoort questioned whether there now exists yet another move-
ment in Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence, toward "greater moralism and the assessment of
blame on those who hold immense economic power and status [including institu-
tions]." Id. at S15. Concluding that Rule 10b-5 has proven itself adaptable under
such political and socio-economic shifts, Professor Langevoort posited that the Rule
has not outlived its usefulness since "Rule 10b-5's intellectual wobble is the product
not only of politics and emotion in the face of marketplace change, but the lack of
convincing insight into the objective reality of investing." Id. at S16. This Comment
asserts that the shifting landscape of investing and the attendant need for regula-
tory shift militates against an adherence to the O'Hagan analysis, which would
likely force government regulators to seek a potentially narrow legislative definition
of insider trading.
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Congress to define insider trading,86 it is likely that any such
legislative proposals would be problematic. Any repudiation of
the misappropriation theory by the Supreme Court will create a
massive chasm in the government's enforcement net.87 As the
securities markets continue to grow in complexity and interna-
tional scope,' the SEC will prosecute more insider trading viola-
tions than ever before.89 An adoption of the O'Hagan analysis
will lead to an undue restriction on the government's enforce-
ment power at a critical point in the evolution of the securities
markets, and will severely curtail the SEC's ability to regulate
" See Improper Activities in the Securities Industry: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs, 100th Cong., 4-5 (1987) (recounting importance of legislative attempt to define
insider trading); Langenvoort, supra note 85, at S20 n.70 ("In 1987 and 1988, an
ambitious effort was undertaken to define insider trading, and it received consider-
able support from the SEC, the private bar, and some members of Congress."); see
also Jon R. Beeson, Rounding the Peg to Fit the Hole: A Proposed Regulatory Reform
of the Misappropriation Theory, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1077, 1079 n.3 (1996) ("The term
'insider trading' has never been explicitly defined in the federal securities laws.
Congress deliberated over whether to include the definition in the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984, but ultimately determined that the existing substantive law,
as developed by the courts, was adequately clear."). The SEC has expressed concern
over the potential effects of a statutory definition on their enforcement program.
The concern regards the loss of appropriately flexible standards, and the resulting
inability of the government to redress future insider trading derivations. See Karl
Groskaufmanis, The SEC's Enforcement Nose Dive, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 16, 1991, at
21, 22.
8 McLucas & Angotti, supra note 74, at 8 (stating repudiation of misappropria-
tion theory has serious implications in governmental enforcement). Among the
situations in which the SEC would have no authority to investigate include, by way
of example: (a) trading in securities of target companies by insiders of acquiring
companies, including lawyers, accountants, investment bankers, and traditional in-
siders such as officers and directors; (b) trading by insiders of a corporation in the
debt issued by their corporation; (c) trading by employees of corporations in the se-
curities of supplier corporations while armed with material nonpublic information
concerning supplier agreements; and (d) trading by employees of investment firms
based on unpublished research reports.
88 See generally SEC Report to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Internationaliza-
tion of the Securities Markets (1987) (noting large growth rate of international secu-
rities markets); Marc I. Steinberg & Daryl L. Lansdale Jr., Regulation S and Rule
144A: Creating a Workable Fiction in an Expanding Global Securities Market, 29
INTL. LAW. 43 (1995) (evaluating SEC regulatory responses to rapid internationali-
zation of securities markets).
" See generally Tracy Corrigan, Insider Trading Cases Increasing, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 1996; SEC: Insider Trading Increasing with Mergers, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), June 25, 1995 (stating that SEC has more insider trading cases cur-
rently underway than ever before).
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"in the public interest.""
CONCLUSION
In United States v. O'Hagan, the Eighth Circuit became the
second circuit court to reject the misappropriation theory. The
O'Hagan court reasoned that the misappropriation theory failed
to meet section 10(b)'s "deception" and "in connection with" re-
quirements. The court failed to undertake a plenary review of
section 10(b) language, choosing instead to rely on Supreme
Court decisions of no precedential value in criminal prosecutions
such as O'Hagan. Piecemeal language pulled from Supreme
Court decisions regarding the implied private right of action un-
der section 10(b) cannot form the basis for limiting the scope of
government enforcement efforts. The lack of an applicable statu-
tory alternative dictates that the Supreme Court should follow
the lead of Congress by providing the government's enforcement
program with statutory flexibility and accept the responsibility
of weighing policy considerations under an ever changing market
environment.
Timothy Sullivan
" See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
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